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UNITED STATES V. O'HAGAN ': RULE 10B -5, THE "JUDICIAL OAK WHICH
HAS GROWN FROM LITTLE MORE THAN A LEGISLATIVE ACORN," 2 AND THE
ANTIFRAUD LEGISLATION OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934.3
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has addressed the perplexing labyrinth of securities fraud
since the enactment of the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934
("Exchange Act").4 In 1976, the president of a small brokerage firm induced
customers to invest in fictitious escrow accounts, promising high yields to
shareholders.5 The following year, majority shareholders of a Delaware lumber
company instituted a merger based on what the minority shareholders deemed a
fraudulent appraisal of the company's assets.6 In 1980, a financial printer profited
from his purchase and subsequent sale of shares in companies targeted for corporate
117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
2 Brief for Respondent at 12, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997) (No. 96-
842) (discussing Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5
(1996)) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)); see
also Louis LoSS &JOELSELIGMAN, SECuRrTIEs REGULATION 3485 (3d. ed. 1991) ("[I]t is
difficult to think of another instance in the entire corpusjuris in which the interaction of the
legislative, administrative rulemaking, and judicial processes has produced so much from
so little.").
3 Pub. L. No. 105-158, 48 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 15 USC § 78j(b) (1996));
the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. 78n(e) (1994)). The Securities and Exchange Act sections referred to constitute only
those relevant to the analysis of O'Hagan.
4 Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994). The Court outlines
the purpose of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The 1933 Act prescribes the preliminary
distribution of securities, while the 1934 Act deals primarily with the trading of the
securities once distributed. Id. Acting in concert, the two Acts seek to replace the common
law "philosophy of caveat emptor" with the "philosophy of full disclosure." Id. (quoting
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
' Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (holding that a Rule lOb-5 action
must be premised upon an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud and not merely
negligence).
6 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that a Rule lOb-5 action must
include both a breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent conduct).
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takeovers.' Three years later, a corporate "outsider" 8 was given information from
someone within a life insurance and mutual fund organization to intentionally
publicize the company's fraudulent practices.9 In each of these cases the Supreme
Court was charged with interpreting the scope of § 10(b)10 of the Exchange Act and
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule lOb-5."
In United States v. O'Hagan, the Court attempted to reconcile the limitations it
imposed on the scope of § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 in previous cases and the scope of
the SEC's rulemaking authority in promulgating Rule 14e-3 pursuant to § 14(e) of
the Exchange Act.' 2 Specifically, the O'Hagan Court was asked to decide whether:
7 See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
8 See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, And Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 324, 339-53 (1979). The term "outsider" in the
securities context refers to those persons who have no pre-existing fiduciary relationship to
a corporation or its shareholders. Id. at 339. A corporate "insider", therefore, owes some
duty to the corporation or its shareholders by way of a fiduciary relationship. Id. at 343.
9 See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 648-52 (1980).
10 In relevant part, §10(b) of the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance of such rules and regulations as the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1997).
" Under its rulemaking authority the SEC set forth Rule lOb-5, which provides, in
pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or]
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1996).
12 15 U.S.C. §78n(e) (1997) (originally added to the Exchange Act in 1968 by the
Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454); 17 CFR §240.14e-3(a) (1996) (regulating
fraudulent acts in connection with tender offers). Although §14(e) and SEC Rule 14e-3
comprise an important aspect of the Court's decision in O'Hagan, this Note focuses
[Vol. 31:3,4
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UNITED STATES V. O'HAGAN
(1) the "misappropriation theory"' 3 of liability is consistent with the statutory
reading of §10(b) and Rule lOb-5; and whether (2) the SEC improperly adopted
Rule 14e-3(a) in relation to "tender offers"' 4 under its rulemaking authority
particularly on the "misappropriation theory" and its inaugural application to § 10(b) and
Rule 1Ob-5. The governing statutory provision prescribing fraudulent trading in connection
with a tender offer provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person.., to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer... The [SEC]
shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. §78n(e) (1997). In 1980, Rule 14e-3(a) was promulgated pursuant to the SEC's
rulemaking authority under § 14(e). The Rule provides:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer (the 'offering person'), it shall constitute a fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the
[Exchange] Act for any other person who is in possession of material information
he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to
know has been acquired directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer,
or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on
behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to
be purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities convertible into
or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or
to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable
time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are
publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
17 CFR §240.14e-3(a) (1996).
1" See Barbara B. Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading
on Nonpublic Information, 13 HoFsTRA L. REv. 101, 101 (1984). The misappropriation
theory focuses on a breach of duty owed by a corporate outsider to the source of information
related to a securities transaction. Id. The breach of duty need not be to the actual parties
to the transaction, unlike the classical theory of liability. Id. at 102 (contrasting Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), which applied the classical theory of liability
discussed infra Part II).
"4 A tender offer is defined as: "A public announcement by a company or individual
indicating that it will pay a price above the current market price for the shares 'tendered' of
a company it wishes to acquire or take control of... [S]uch purchase [sic] offer is used in
an effort to go around the management of the second company, which is resisting
acquisition." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1468 (6th ed. 1990); see also Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 24-37 (1977) (discussing the legislative history of the Williams Act and
§ 14(e) with regard to tender offers, generally).
1998] 433
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provided by § 14(e).' 5
Part II of this Note outlines the judicial development of the misappropriation
theory and the objectives of the tender offer legislation. 16 Part III presents the
issues confronting the Supreme Court in O'Hagan and explains the Court's
conclusions. 7 Part IV analyzes the Court's holding and assesses how its approval
of the misappropriation theory and its interpretation of the SEC's ability to apply
Rule 14e-3(a) will impact fraudulent activity in secutities transactions.'
8
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of the Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation theory imposes liability on a person who misappropriates
material nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty or similar relationship
of trust and confidence and uses that information in a securities transaction. 9 In
contrast to the classical theory of liability under Rule 10b-5, the misappropriation
theory does not require a breach of fiduciary duty to the buyer or seller of
securities.2'
15 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The question presented to the Court is
whether the SEC, through Rule 14e-3(a) may impose a duty to disclose nonpublic
information in the absence of a fiduciary duty, which generally accompanies violations
involving fraud or deceit. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2214-15 (1997).
16 See infra notes 19-40 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
18 See infa notes 70-108 and accompanying text. This Note questions the Court's
reasoning in O'Hagan at three levels. First, in its previous decisions, the Court was
reluctant to expand the reach of Rule 1 Ob-5 for fear of engrafting judicial gloss onto § 10(b),
a concern which the Court ignored when it adopted the misappropriation theory in O'Hagan.
Second, the Court adopted a version of the misappropriation theory not put forth by the SEC.
Third, §14(e) permits the SEC to promulgate rules and regulations designed to prevent
fraudulent activity in connection with tender offers, but the statute does not permit the SEC
to create its own species of fraud to achieve that purpose.
19 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207 ("The 'Misappropriation Theory' holds that a person
commits fraud 'in connection with' a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading
purposes.").
20 Id. ('The classical theory targets a corporate insider's breach of duty to shareholders
with whom the insider transacts; the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis
of nonpublic information by a corporate 'outsider' in breach of a duty owed not to the
trading party, but to the source of the information.").
[Vol. 31:3,4
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The misappropriation theory first surfaced in Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
the seminal case Chiarella v. United States.2" Applying the classical theory of
liability, the majority in Chiarella held that Rule lOb-5 could not apply to a
corporate outsider who, owing no fiduciary duty to shareholders or buyers and
sellers of securities, trades on nonpublic confidential information.22 The Court
recognized that disclosure of material information prior to a securities transaction
is compelled by Rule lOb-5 but only if there is "a fiduciary or other similar relation
21 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,239-45 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
see also Douglas G. Scribner, Note & Comment, When Greed is No Longer Good: An
Analysis of the Policy Considerations Underlying Rule I OB-5's Misappropriation Theory,
26 U. TOE. L. REv. 205, 209 (1994) (crediting the theory's introduction to the federal courts
as stemming from the Chief Justice's dissent).
22 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33. A "mark up man" (printer) worked for a financial
printing company in New York, handling corporate takeover bid announcements. Id. at 224.
The printer received the documents from the corporations without the names of the
companies set for takeover. Id. Prior to the corporations announcement of the takeover
bids, the printer managed to identify the names of the target companies using information
contained on the documents. Id. The printer used this information to purchase shares in the
target companies without disclosing his knowledge. Id. He then sold the shares upon
announcement of the takeover bids for a substantial profit. Id. In an opinion authored by
Justice Powell, the Court focused on the relationship between the one using the confidential
information and the shareholders of the company effected by the use of that information.
Applying the classical theory of liability, the Court approved a prior SEC decision holding
that a corporate insider could not use material nonpublic information "unless he has first
disclosed all material inside information known to him." Id. at 226-27 (approving In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)). The Commission set forth the circumstances
under which the duty to disclose information exists in the securities context. In re Cady,
Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). First, there must be a relationship allowing access to
nonpublic information, intended only for corporate use and not for one's personal benefit;
and Second, it must radiate a degree of unfairness which can only accompany situations in
which one party takes advantage of information he knows is unavailable to others. Id. at
912. The federal courts have addressed various circumstances in which such a duty is
imposed. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulph Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) (finding a §10(b) violation where corporate insiders used
nonpublic information for their own private use); Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics
Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that the requirement of disclosing
nonpublic information arises only when that party has a duty to disclose it). But see, e.g.,
General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968) (where it was held
that there is no duty to reveal nonpublic information if the party is not an insider and owes
no fiduciary duty to the offering corporation).
1998]
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of trust and confidence between (the parties)" to a securities transaction.2 3
Chief Justice Burger argued that Rule 1Ob-5 was sufficiently broad to encompass
the principle that "a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an
absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading. 24 The Court
refused to consider the merits of the misappropriation theory because it was not
presented to the jury at trial.25 While the Court did not reject the theory, it left open
its consideration for another day.26
23 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. The printer's use of the nonpublic information was not
a fraud and thus not violative of Rule lOb-5 because he was not a corporate insider and
therefore owed no duty to disclose prior to trading. Id. at 231 ("[Ajpplication of a duty to
disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place
the shareholder's welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent
use of material, nonpublic information ... [ but the printer's] use of that information was
not a fraud under § 10(b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to disclose it before
trading.") (emphasis added); see also Aldave, supra note 13, at 104 (noting that the
Chiarella Court's emphasis on fiduciary duty as a reflection of the fraud requirement in
Rule 1 Ob-5, which parallels common law fraud, requires a showing of a "misrepresentation
of a material fact, scienter, reliance, causation, and damages").
24 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239, 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The brief by the
Government premised the printer's conviction on an alternative theory which described a
§10(b) violation as a breach of duty to the acquiring corporation occurring "when [the
printer] acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of his position as an employee of
a printer employed by the corporation." Id. ("I would read §10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to
encompass and build on this principle: to mean that a person who has misappropriated
nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from
trading."). Citing the majority's reliance on the Exchange Commission's Cady, Roberts
decision, the Chief Justice would not have limited the duty to disclose to one with a fiduciary
relationship, even though as a general rule one party to a business transaction owes no duty
to another party. Id. at 239-40 ("[The rule should give way when an information advantage
is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful
means.") (citing In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)).
25 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236-37 ("The jury was not instructed on the nature or elements
of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone other than the sellers. Because we cannot affirm a
criminal conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury, we will not speculate
upon whether such a duty exists, whether it has been breached, or whether such a breach
constitutes a violation of §10(b)."). Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion agreed that
the Court should not have addressed the issue but acknowledged that if a corporate outsider
had "breached a duty to the acquiring companies that had entrusted confidential information
to his employers, a legitimate argument could be made that his actions constituted a 'a fraud
or a deceit' upon those companies 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.'
Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
2 Id. ("I think the Court wisely leaves the resolution of this issue for another day.").
[Vol. 31:3,4
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Crucial to the development of the misappropriation theory was the Court's
interpretation of the meaning of fraud and "fiduciary duty" in Rule lOb-5 cases.2 7
This issue was addressed in Dirks v. SEC28, where the Court held that a corporate
tippee 29 could not be guilty of §10(b) and Rule lOb-5 violations for failure to
disclose material, nonpublic information, absent a breach of fiduciary duty by the
corporate tipper.3 ° Central to the Court's finding was the absence of any fraudulent
conduct by the tipper and the lack of any personally beneficial motive in disclosing
the information to the tippee.31
27 See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (addressing whether anyone who receives
insider information has a duty to disclose under Rule lOb-5). To this point the duty to
disclose arises only when the party owes a fiduciary obligation to shareholders and
purchases securities based on material inside information. See Aldave, supra note 13, at
107-08 ("The distinction between the insider who sells and the insider who buys may well
be a 'sorry' one, but it is a natural consequence of a theory which premises liability on a
preexisting relationship between the trading parties.").
2' 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
29 A tipper (an insider) is one who is afforded access to information within a corporation
due to his employment or status with the corporation. Grumet v. Shearson/American Exp.,
Inc., 564 F.Supp. 336, 340 (D.N.J. 1983). A tippee (an outsider) is one who is the recipient
of that information due to the actions of the tipper and who otherwise has no connection
with the corporation. Ross v. Licht, 263 F.Supp. 395, 410 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
30 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 ("[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of
a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee
and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach."). Dirks (tippee) worked
for a New York broker-dealer firm, advising investors on insurance company and other
institutional securities. Id. at 648. In an effort to expose ongoing fraudulent activity, a
corporate insider (tipper) for a life insurance and mutual funds securities company informed
the tippee and encouraged him to advise investors and expose the fraud publicly. Id. at 649.
The tippee notified investors, causing many of them to withdraw their holdings in the
securities company. Id. The tippee owned no stock in the securities company and therefore
owed no direct fiduciary duty to its shareholders. Id. at 665 ("[I]t is undisputed that Dirks
himself was a stranger to [the securities company], with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its
shareholders.").
31 Id. at 663. Justice Powell, writing for the majority of the Court, explained that a
tippee may be derivatively liable for a breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the tipper. Id. at
660 ("[S]ome tippees must assume an insider's duty to the shareholders not because they
receive inside information, but rather because it has been made available to them improp-
erly."). The Court found that the tipper did not breach his fiduciary duty by disclosing
nonpublic information because he "received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing
[the securities company's] secrets, nor was [his] purpose to make a gift of valuable
information to Dirks." Id. at 667 (premising a breach of fiduciary duty on the notion that
the insider receive some pecuniary gain from his disclosure to a third party) (citing In re
1998] 437
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The Court's interpretations of the scope §10(b) and Rule lOb-5 evidenced a
general reluctance to expand the type of acts deemed manipulative and deceptive,32
while evidencing a willingness to expand the category of persons owing a fiduciary
duty to trading parties.33 Thus, the Court left open the possibility that one who
misappropriates nonpublic information, in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the
source of such information, violates § 10(b).34
B. The Scope of the SEC's Rulemaking Authority Under §14(e) of the Exchange Act
§ 14(e) permits the SEC to promulgate a rule that is "reasonably designed to
prevent acts and practices that are fraudulent."35 Accordingly, the SEC established
Rule 14e-3(a), which imposes a duty on traders in connection with a tender offer to
either disclose nonpublic information relevant to the offer or to abstain from using
such information.36
Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)).
32 See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) ("[S]ection 10(b)
is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it must catch is fraud. When an allegation
of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.").
33 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n. 14 ("Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate
information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant
working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders.").
But, Chiarella cautioned that the importance of requiring a fiduciary relationship was to
prevent the injustice of "recognizing a general duty between all participants in market
transactions to forgo actions based on material nonpublic information." Chiarella, 445 U.S.
at 233.
14 As noted, under the misappropriation theory, the fraudulent conduct is a party
misappropriating confidential information entrusted to him for his own pecuniary gain. See
Aldave, supra note 13, at 119 (rather than the parties to a securities transaction, the duty
owed is to the source of the nonpublic information). The federal courts have recognized full
disclosure as an absolute defense, since the legislative goal of maintaining informed markets
would not be thwarted in that instance. Id. at 121. Consistent with the common law, the
fraud is not complete under the misappropriation theory until some damage has been caused.
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981) (also holding that §10(b)
violations are not limited to parties to a securities transaction).
" 15 U.S.C. §78n(e) (1997).
36 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2215 (1997) ("Rule 14e-3(a) is a 'disclose
or abstain from trading' requirement.") (quoting Rules & Regulations Securities & Exchange
Commission, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410 (1980)) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240)). The
underlying goal of § 14(e) is to ensure that shareholders, in their consideration of tender
offers, are not sabotaged by a lack of information. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,
422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) ("The purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that public
shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required
[Vol. 31:3,4
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Prior to O'Hagan, the Supreme Court had not considered the validity of Rule
14e-3. 37 The federal courts have interpreted Rule 14e-3(a) to impose liability on a
person who fails to disclose nonpublic information in connection with a tender
offer, without requiring a breach of a fiduciary duty.38 In the context of securities,
fraudulent conduct requires a breach of a fiduciary duty.39 Thus, the Supreme
Court's task in O'Hagan was to determine whether the SEC exceeded its
rulemaking authority by excluding this requirement.40
m. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
On October 4, 1988, James Herman O'Hagan, an attorney for Dorsey &
Whitney,4 sold his shares of Pillsbury call options and common stock for a profit
of more than $4.3 million.42 On that date, the stock of the Pillsbury Company was
to respond without adequate information."); Schrieber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S.
1, 11 (1985) (discussing the legislative history of § 14(e), the Court quoted House and Senate
Reports which emphasized that "persons engaged in making or opposing tender offers or
otherwise seeking to influence the decision of investors or the outcome of the tender offer
are under an obligation to make full disclosure of material information to those with whom
they deal") (citing H.R. REP. No. 1711, at 11 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811,
2821; S. REP. No. 550, at 11 (1967)) (internal quotations omitted).
"' See Michael J. Voves, Comment, United States v. O'Hagan: Improperly Incorporat-
ing Common Law Fiduciary Obligations Into S 14(E) of the Securities and Exchange Act,
81 MINN. L. REv. 1015, 1030-31 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court has only addressed
§ 14(e) in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985)).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(holding that Rule 14e-3(a) "creates a duty in those traders who fall within its ambit to
abstain or disclose, without regard to whether the trader owes a pre-existing fiduciary duty
to respect the confidentiality of the information"); accord SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162,
1165 (10th Cir. 1992); SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 1995).
" Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) ("One who fails to disclose
material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only...
[when] the 'other party is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation
of trust or confidence.' ") (quoting In re Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)).
o O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2214 (stating the question posed on appeal- "Did the
Commission... exceed its rulemaking authority under § 14(e) when it adopted Rule 14e-3(a)
without requiring a showing that the trading at issue entailed a breach of fiduciary duty?").
"' Id. at 2205 (O'Hagan was a partner at this Minneapolis, Minnesota law firm during
the time the following events occurred.).
42 Id. By October of 1988, O'Hagan owned 2,500 unexpired Pillsbury call options and
5,000 shares of Pillsbury common stock after purchases beginning on August 18, 1988, and
concluding in September, 1988. Id.
1998] 439
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the subject of a tender offer made by Grand Metropolitan P.L.C. ("Grand Met").43
Grand Met hired Dorsey & Whitney as local counsel to represent them in the tender
offer." On September 9, 1988, Dorsey and Whitney withdrew as counsel for Grand
Met, nearly one month before Grand Met announced its tender offer for the
Pillsbury Company's stock.45
Although O'Hagan did not perform any duties in connection with Grand Met's
representation 46, the SEC began an investigation of O'Hagan's transactions and
issued a 57- count indictment alleging violations of securities laws and other
criminal violations for attempting to conceal his conversion of unrelated client
trusts.
47
B. Procedure
The SEC's indictment 48 charged O'Hagan with three counts of violating federal
money laundering statutes 49; twenty counts of mail fraud5°; seventeen counts of
41 Id. Grand Metropolitan P.L.C. is a London, England based corporation. Id.
Id. Not surprisingly, O'Hagan no longer worked for Dorsey & Whitney, nor was he
a practicing attorney at the time this case was before the Court. Brief for Respondent, supra
note 1, at 1. The Court also noted that O'Hagan was disbarred by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota. Id. (referring to In re O'Hagan, 450 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. 1990)).
" Id. According to Respondent's brief, O'Hagan had completed most of his purchases
before August 26, 1988, with the exception of his purchase of 5,000 shares of Pillsbury
stock on September 20, 1988. Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, at 3.
4 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205. O'Hagan asserted in his brief that he had no way of
knowing about the Grand Met tender offer. Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, at 5-6.
O'Hagan bases this assertion on the Government's failure to put forth any evidence
regarding conversations he might have had with the partner in Dorsey & Whitney handling
the Grand Met tender offer. Id. at 2-6.
47 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205. According to O'Hagan, the Government provided no
evidence that he traded with nonpublic information. Id. at 2205 n. 1. The investments,
O'Hagan asserted, were based on solicitations from brokers who had learned of Grand Met's
interest in Pillsbury through news reports and investment orders from the broker's other
clients, indicating that something was brewing. Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, at 2.
48 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205 (listing O'Hagan's counts under the indictment).
49 18 U.S.C.§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(I) (1997). The money laundering and mail fraud charges
drew scant attention from the Court and were not at issue on appeal, aside from the question
of whether liability under these sections rested on the same criteria as the securities fraud
and tender offer convictions. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2219-20.
'0 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1997).
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securities fraud51 ; and seventeen counts of fraudulent trading in connection with a
tender offer.52 O'Hagan was sentenced to forty-one months of imprisonment after
a jury convicted him on all fifty-seven counts.5 3
The Eighth Circuit reversed O'Hagan's convictions.54 Following the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning, the Eighth Circuit rejected the application of the misappropria-
tion theory to § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.55 The Court of Appeals also found that the
SEC exceeded its rulemaking authority conferred by § 14(e) by enacting Rule 14e-
3(a), which prohibits trading while in possession of material, nonpublic information
relating to tender offers without requiring a breach of fiduciary duty. 6 Since the
51 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1997); 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1996). See supra notes 10-11 (setting
forth the statutory and regulatory text).
52 15 U.S.C. §78n(e) (1997); 17 CFR §240.14e-3(a) (1996). See supra note 12 (setting
forth the statutory and regulatory text).
53 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
51 United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d. 612, 628 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1997).
15 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2206 (referring to the Eighth Circuit's reliance on United
States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943-59 (4th Cir. 1995) and rejecting the misappropriation
theory as well). The Eighth Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory for two reasons: (1)
the theory does not require a showing of misrepresentation or nondisclosure; and (2) the
theory circumvents the requirement that the alleged fraud be 'in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.' Id. at 2211 (citing O'Hagan, 92 F.3d. at 618 which quotes
15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1997)). The first reason for the Eighth Circuit's rejection of the theory
is based on the meaning of the term misappropriation. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d. at 618. Section
10(b) liability requires a material misrepresentation or nondisclosure, not merely
misappropriation of material, nonpublic information. Id. ("By its very definition then, it
does not require either a material misrepresentation or nondisclosure.").
The Eighth Circuit's second reason for rejecting the misappropriation theory rests on the
Supreme Court's holdings in Chiarella , Dirks, and Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,
511 U.S. 164 (1994) (holding that aprivate plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting
suit under § 10(b)). The Eighth Circuit interpreted those holdings to mean that "only a
breach of a duty to parties to the securities transaction or, at the most, to other market
participants such as investors, will be sufficient to give rise to §10(b) liability." O'Hagan,
92 F.3d. at 618. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit explained, the imposition of duty owed to the
source of nonpublic information does not follow from § 10(b), since such an action is not 'in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §78j(b)
(1997)).
6 0'Hagan, 92 F.3d. at 618. The Eighth Circuit departed from the reasoning of three
federal circuits in holding that the SEC exceeded its rulemaking authority by not including
the requirement of a breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631 (7th
Cir. 1995) (holding that Rule 14e-3(a) imposes a duty to disclose or refrain from trading on
nonpublic information, irrespective of a breach of fiduciary duty); SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d
1998]
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money laundering and mail fraud convictions rested on the same principles as the
violations of the securities laws, the Eighth Circuit rejected those convictions as
well.57
Noting the conflict among the federal circuits with regard to the misappropria-
tion theory, the Supreme Court granted writ of certiori to petitioners.5"
C. Holding
In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Ginsberg, the majority approved the
misappropriation theory and upheld the SEC' s authority to regulate under Rule 14e-
1162, 1166-67 (10th Cir. 1992) (liability under Rulel4e-3 does not require a breach of
fiduciary duty); accord United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (noting that Rule 14e-3(a) "creates a duty in those traders who fall within its ambit to
abstain or disclose, without regard to whether the trader owes a pre-existing fiduciary duty
to respect the confidentiality of the information"). Essentially, the court found that the
SEC's implementation of Rule 14e-3(a) was inconsistent with the power authorized by
§ 14(e) and frustrated the legislative policies Congress intended. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d. at 624
(citing Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 143 (1984) as authority
for determining whether an administrative rule exceeds its statutory mandate).
The Eighth Circuit focused on the language of § 14(e), which allows the SEC to "define,
and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are
fraudulent . . . ." O'Hagan, 92 F.3d. at 624 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §78n(e)). The court
determined that the structure of the statute confined the SEC's rulemaking authority to
"prescribing" and "defining" actions that constitute the legal definition of fraud. Id. The
court rejected the argument that § 14(e) permits the SEC to "define" and "prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent conduct." Id. (emphasis added) (such an
interpretation would allow "the SEC to create its own definition of fraud in implementing
the statute"). The Eighth Circuit turned to the Supreme Court's holding in Schreiber and
determined that the SEC was limited to the definition of fraudulent conduct applied by
Congress to § 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 which requires fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
acts. Id. at 625 (citing Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). Since
the three types of fraudulent conduct prescribed by § 10(b) relate to failures to disclose, such
an obligation does not arise unless there is a duty to speak. Id.
"7 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 627-28 ("Because we have vacated all of the securities fraud and
mail fraud counts, there no longer remain any convictions to serve as predicate conduct upon
which to base the money laundering counts."). The Eighth Circuit recognized, however, that
the mere fact that it had reversed the securities convictions did not, ipsofacto, mandate that
the money laundering and mail fraud convictions also be reversed. Id. at 627 (citing
Carpenter v. United States, 445 U.S. 19, 24 (1987)) (holding that mail fraud and wire fraud
convictions did not necessitate securities fraud convictions or visa versa).
58 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1997).
(Vol. 31:3,4
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3(a). 59 First, the Court found that the misappropriation theory60 fit within § 10(b)'s
requirement that the violative act constitute a "deceptive device or contrivance used
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 6 1 Second, the Court rejected
the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of its holdings in Chiarella, Dirks, and Central
Bank, stating that those precedents do not preclude application of the misappropria-
tion theory to § 10(b). 62  The Court did not find that the duty arising under the
" Id. at 2199. The Court remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit, not only to enter
judgment consistent with the opinion, but also to consider O'Hagan's alternative theories
for attacking his mail fraud convictions. Id. at 2220. O'Hagan also preserved his rights to
challenge, on remand, the Government's contention that the information used by O'Hagan
for his trades was nonpublic. Id. at 2205.
60 Id. at 2208. The Court accepted the Government's definition of the misappropriation
theory as one who "commits fraud 'in connection with' a securities transaction, and thereby
violates §10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for
securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information." Id.
at 2207 (citing Brief for United States at 14, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1997) (No. 96-842)).
61 Id. at 2208. The Court began its analysis of whether the misappropriation theory fit
within the scope of § 10(b) by addressing the meaning of "deceptive device or contrivance."
Id. A misappropriator satisfies the deceptive requirement because he converts information
from one to which he owes a fiduciary duty for his own personal gain, while maintaining a
facade of loyalty to the source of the information. Id. However, once the misappropriator
discloses the information entrusted to him as a fiduciary, there can be no deception and
hence no violation. Id. ("[B]ecause the deception essential to the misappropriation theory
involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source
that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no 'deceptive device' and thus
no §10(b) violation--.. ."). Cf Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (finding no
deceptive or manipulative act on the part of majority shareholders owing a fiduciary duty to
minority shareholders since all relevant facts were disclosed). Next, the Court was satisfied
that the requirement of § 10(b), that the deceptive use of the nonpublic information be "in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security," was met "because the fiduciary's fraud
is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when,
without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities."
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209. Thus, the misappropriator would not implicate § 10(b) if he
used the confidential information for reasons other than personal gain related to securities
transactions. "The theory does not catch all conceivable forms of fraud involving
confidential information; rather, it catches fraudulent means of capitalizing on such
information through securities transactions." Id.
62 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2211-13. First, the Court stated that Chiarella merely
declined to address the potential of § 10(b) liability premised on the misappropriation theory
because it was not presented to the jury. Id. Chiarella merely held that §10(b) liability "is
premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between
the parties to a transaction." Id. (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230
1998]
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statute could only exist with respect to parties to a securities transaction. 63 Third,
rejecting the Court of Appeals charge that the SEC exceeded its authority by
creating its own definition of fraud in omitting the requirement of a breach of
fiduciary duty under Rule 14e-3(a), the Court characterized § 14(e)'s delegation of
rulemaking authority as permissibly "definitional and prophylactic." 64 Finally, the
Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's reversal of the mail fraud convictions.65
Justice Scalia filed an opinion, concurring in part, and dissenting with respect
to the majority's reading of §10(b).66 Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice
(1980)). Next, the Court noted that Dirks did not preclude application of the misappropria-
tion theory. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213 ("Dirks thus presents no suggestion that a person
who gains nonpublic information through misappropriation in breach of a fiduciary duty
escapes § 10(b) liability, when, without alerting the source, he trades on the information.")
(citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)). Finally, the majority held that Central Bank did
not limit the scope of § 10(b) liability to deceptive conduct made by a fiduciary owing a duty
to purchasers and sellers to a securities transaction. Id. at 2213 ("[W]e held that only actual
purchasers or sellers of securities may maintain a private action under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5.") (quoting Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)). The majority
explained that, "[T]he purchaser/seller standing requirement for private actions under
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is of no import in criminal prosecutions for willful violations of those
provisions." Id. (quoting Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258,281
(1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
63 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2212. The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's interpretation
that Chiarella' s holding limited the duty to disclose nonpublic, confidential information to
parties to a securities transaction. Id. ("The Court did not hold in Chiarella that the only
relationship prompting liability for trading on undisclosed information is the relationship
between a corporation's insiders and shareholders.").
6 Id. at 2214 (focusing on the second sentence of § 14(e) which authorizes the SEC to
"prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative").
65 Id. at 2220. The Court dispensed with the Government's argument that the mail fraud
charges were independent of the securities violations. Id. at 2219. The Court noted that the
Eighth Circuit correctly recognized that the mail fraud convictions did not necessarily follow
from the securities convictions. Id. (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24
(1987)). However, the Court of Appeals reversed the mail fraud convictions on the basis
that the structure of the charges were indispensably linked to the securities charges. Id.
Therefore, the Court did not "linger over this matter for [its] rulings on the securities fraud
issues require[d] that [they] reverse the Court of Appeals judgment on the mail fraud counts
as well." Id. at 2220. The Court also noted that O'Hagan's money laundering convictions
were not raised on appeal and therefore remained intact. Id. at 2219 n.24.
66 Id. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In strikingly limited
breadth, Justice Scalia rejected the majority's analysis of §10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Id.
Without so much as mentioning the misappropriation theory, Justice Scalia found that the
[Vol. 31:3,4
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Rehnquist, authored a lengthy dissenting opinion, rejecting the majority's analysis
of both § 10(b) and § 14(e).67 Justice Thomas concluded that the majority's
application of the misappropriation theory to § 10(b) was "incoherent and inconsis-
tent' 68 and that the SEC failed to justify its promulgation of Rule 14e-3(a).69
majority neglected to employ the principle of lenity which would limit an expansive reading
of an ambiguous criminal statute such as §10(b). Id. (citing Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50
(1995), and United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)). On that basis, the Justice found
that §10(b), "must be construed to require the manipulation or deception of a party to
securities transaction." Id. He found Justice Thomas' reasoning for rejecting the majority's
analysis of §10(b), that the Government's theory was not "coherent and consistent",
irrelevant. Id. The Government's interpretation of a statute found to be ambiguous is not
accorded deference under judicial review. Id. (citing Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Thus, the issue was whether the Court's
interpretation of the statute is justified "regardless of the reasons the Government gave."
Id. Justice Scalia had no quarrel with the majority regarding Rule 14e-3(a) analysis. Id.
67 Id. at 2221-31 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 2221 ("Because the Commission's misappropriation theory fails to provide a
coherent and consistent interpretation . . ., I dissent."). The theory is incoherent and
inconsistent to Justice Thomas for three reasons. First, it does not satisfy §10(b)'s
requirement that the fraudulent act be used "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security." Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1997)). Mr. O'Hagan's breach of duty was to his
employer, the source of the confidential information, but not to a purchaser or seller of
securities. Second, the Government's inconsistent argument that the "in connection with"
requirement is met since the deceptive conduct and purchase of a sale or purchase of a
security are connected because such information's only use is for the purpose of buying or
selling securities. Id. Here, Justice Thomas finds a discrepancy. The statute requires that
the fraudulent act be consummated by the sale or purchase of a security, yet the theft of
confidential information could be used for purposes other than the purchase or sale of
securities. Id. at 2224. Under the majority's theory, one who merely breaches a fiduciary
duty may violate §10(b). Finally, Justice Thomas noted that the majority tries to rescue its
incoherent analysis by sustituting its own theory for the Government's and by pointing to
the broad policies underlying the Exchange Act. However, "regardless of the overarching
purpose of the securities laws, it is not illegal to run afoul of the 'purpose' of a statute, only
its letter." Id. at 2225.
69 Id. at 2221 ("[W]hile § 14(e) does allow regulations prohibiting nonfraudulent acts,
neither the majority nor the Commission identifies any relevant underlying fraud against
which Rule 14e-3(a) reasonably provides prophylaxis."). Justice Thomas agrees with the
majority that Rule 14e-3(a) is a codification of Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in
Chiarella, only that it is applied in the tender offer context. Id. at 2228. However, Justice
Thomas does not agree that the SEC's authority under §14(e) permits them to "prohibit
trading in connection with any nondisclosure, regardless of the presence of a pre-existing
duty to disclose." Id. The SEC may only regulate nondeceptive acts if such regulations are
reasonably designed to prevent manipulative or deceptive acts as such acts are defined in the
securities context. Id. ("Insofar as the Rule 14e-3(a) purports to 'define' acts and practices
1998]
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court in O'Hagan did little to mitigate the enigmatic state of
securities regulation.7 ° First, the Court engrafted further judicial gloss on the
already frayed §10(b) and Rule lOb-5.7" Second, the Court perpetuated the
uncertainty of § 10(b) liability by proclaiming that the version of the misappropria-
tion theory it was embracing did not impose an absolute duty on any party in
possession of nonpublic information, while simultaneously holding that such a duty
was not limited to parties to a securities transaction.7 2 Finally, even assuming,
that 'are fraudulent,' it must be measured against our precedents interpreting the scope of
fraud.") (citing Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11, n.11 (1985)).
Furthermore, since the SEC cannot "coherently" assert that Mr. O' Hagan' s misappropriation
(deceptive act) was in connection to the sale or purchase of securities, it cannot accomplish
the same thing by stating that the misappropriation was in connection with a tender offer.
Id. at 2229 ("[T]he Commission may not seek to prevent indirectly conduct which it could
not, under its current theory (misappropriation theory), prohibit directly.").
70 Elizabeth S. Strong, Supreme Court Endorses Misappropriation Theory, N.Y.L.J.,
July 17, 1997, at 1 ("The endorsement of liability for fiduciaries who misappropriate
nonpublic information and use it to trade for personal profit leaves the door open for
criminal prosecutions, and may well foster new theories of liability. When and against
whom the government will be able to enforce the misappropriation theory is now open for
discussion."). But see, David Cowan Bayne, Insider Trading and the Misappropriation
Theory: The Awakening, 1995, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 487, 530 (1997) ("Do not forget that
it was the chaos in the law that spawned the Theory in the first place."). However, the
misappropriation theory may not have the curing effect the Court had hoped. See Lawrence
Rosenbloom, Note, Is it Inside or Out?- A Proposal to Clarify the Misappropriation Theory
of Unlawful Trading, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 867, 899 (1996) (noting that a legitimate
argument supports the fact that the theory is "amorphous and has the potential to have as
many permutations as there are fiduciary 'or similar' relationships.").
"' Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, The Supreme Court Upheld the Misappro-
priation Theory, But How Far the SEC Will Take the Ruling is Anything But Clear, NAT'L
L.J. Aug. 4, 1997, at B4 ("In a sweeping decision reminiscent of the Supreme Court's
expansive interpretations of the federal securities laws in the 1960s and early 1970's ....
Abandoning [its] literalist reading of the federal securities laws, the majority ruled that the
misappropriation theory was well within the broad remedial purposes of the Exchange
Act.").
72 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208 n.6 ("The Government does not propose that we adopt
a misappropriation theory [that would] impose 'an absolute duty to disclose that information
or to refrain from trading' ") (quoting Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella v. United
States, 455 U.S. 222, 240 (1980)). But, Chiarella held that the mere possession of
confidential nonpublic information without a breach of a fiduciary duty by a person in whom
"the sellers had placed their trust and confidence" could not invoke §10(b) liability. 455
U.S. at 232. The misappropriation theory adopted by the O'Hagan Court imposes liability
[Vol. 31:3,4
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arguendo, that the Court was correct in presuming that Rule 14e-3(a) was not the
equivalent of the SEC designing its own definition of fraud, it is hard to see how the
absence of a requirement of a breach of fiduciary duty accomplishes the legislative
purposes of § 14(e).73
A. The Nebulous Scope of The Misappropriation Theory
In adopting the misappropriation theory in O'Hagan, the majority insisted that
the theory fell neatly within the precedent interpreting the scope of § 10(b). 4 While
Justice Powell effectively dodged the misappropriation issue in Chiarella, he left
open the question whether the duty giving rise to the disclosure requirement under
§ 10(b) could stem from a relationship to parties other than those dealing in a
securities transaction. Yet, over a decade has passed since the Chiarella decision
and Congress has still done nothing to answer Justice Powell's invitation to amend
the statute and enable the SEC to regulate the misappropriation of confidential
information to situations other than 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.'
7 6
for a breach of fiduciary duty to parties unrelated to a securities transaction i.e. Mr.
O'Hagan's former law firm.
" The SEC's goal in promulgating Rule 14e-3(a) is to eliminate "'unfair disparities in
market information and market disruption.' " Rules & Regulations Securities & Exchange
Commission, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,412 (1980) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240). The
Rule does not accomplish the directive of § 14(e) of prescribing "means reasonably designed
to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative," because
the Rule does not require a breach of fiduciary duty, which is inherent in finding and
preventing fraud. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2230 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§78n(e) (1997)). Approval of the Rule by the Court allows the SEC to create 'market
disruption' rather than preventing it, because it will punish market players for acting on
market rumors or leaks, making it a regulation that is too broad to be enforceable. See Pitt
& Groskaufmanis, supra note 71, at B4. ("Despite everyone's best efforts, putative tender
offers often become the source of market rumors. Trading on the basis of such rumors is not
proscribed. O'Hagan, however, adds to the risks.").
7' O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2214 (after outlining the holdings asserted by the Eighth
Circuit in support of its finding the misappropriation theory inapplicable to §10(b), the
majority found the theory "both consistent with the statute and with [their] precedents").
71 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236 ("We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it
was not submitted to the jury.").
76 The result of Congress' inaction was a split among the Federal Circuits, leading to
O'Hagan. The Circuits were split three to two in favor of the misappropriation theory with
the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in favor of the theory. See United States v,
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
1998]
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The Court should have recognized the distinction between accomplishing
legislative aims and interpreting legislative text.77 Perhaps the incentive to put to
rest the uncertainty of the question left open by Chiarella coaxed the Court into
extending the scope of § 10(b) beyond its plain meaning.7" The misappropriation
banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990). The Fourth and
Eighth Circuits are against the theory. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir.
1995); United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 759
(1997), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997). See generally, Harry Weiss & Laura Walker, The
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: The Supreme Court Grants the
Government's Petition for Certiori in U.S. v. O'Hagan, 981 PRAC. L INST./CORP. 37,39-40
(1997) (reporting on the status of the misappropriation theory in the federal courts).
7 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226 ("[W]hen Rule lOb-5 was promulgated in 1942, the SEC
did not discuss the possibility that failure to provide information might run afoul of
§10(b)."). Although §10(b) confers substantial latitude to the SEC, "[T]he rulemaking
power granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal
statute is not the power to make law..." and the "Rule advanced by the Commission...
cannot exceed the power granted to the Commission by Congress under § 10(b)." Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976). See John R. Beeson, Comment,
Rounding the Peg to Fit the Hole: A Proposed Regulatory Reform of the Misappropriation
Theory, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1077, 1107-08 (1996) (an excellent overview of "[t]he Dubious
History of Rule lOb-5"). According to Beeson, the SEC "never anticipated that the rule
would be a 'catch-all' provision for fraud." Id.; see also Joseph J. Humke, Comment, The
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: Outside the Lines of Section 10(b), 80 MARQ.
L. REv. 819, 830 (1997) (referring to Justice Holmes' comment that the judicial interpreta-
tions of statutes should only concern "what Congress said, and not what it meant") (quoting
Oliver Wendel Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv. 417, 419
(1899)).
78 See Aldave, supra note 13, at 121 (advocating adoption of the misappropriation theory
to rid the confusion associated with interpreting §10(b)). "One of the virtues of the
misappropriation theory is that it eliminates many of the fictions and anomalies that are
associated with the Chiarella-Dirks reasoning." Id. This position is none other than wrong,
for the O'Hagan Court expressly accepted the reasoning in Chiarella and Dirks, and merely
found that their holdings did not forego the applicability of the misappropriation theory. See
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2212 ("Chiarella thus expressly left open the misappropriation
theory before us today... Dirks, too left room for application of the misappropriation theory
in cases like the one we confront."). What is very much unclear is the supposed curing
effect the theory will have on the uncertainties of securities regulation. See supra note 70
and accompanying text; see also Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided
Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropriation Theory of Section
IO(B), 59 ALB. L. REV. 139 (1995) (emphasizing that the essence of statutory interpretation
involves drawing a line with regard to a statute's scope). The Supreme Court has
consistently determined the scope of §10(b) "by reviewing the statute and its relatively
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theory "permits liability for a breach of duty owed to individuals who are
unconnected to and perhaps uninterested in a securities transaction. 7 9  By
broadening the scope of § 10(b), the majority ignored decades of precedent warning
against applying an interpretation of the Exchange Act beyond its textual meaning.8"
Instead of creating a regulation that attempts to fit a person's acts within § 10(b) on
an ad hoc basis, the SEC should simply promulgate a rule defining what insider
trading is, thereby making it clear who may violate the statute.81
sparse legislative history." Id. at 142 ("Based on this thoughtful line of cases, which
included vigorous debate among the justices, the Court has held that section 10(b) is an
'antifraud' statute designed to prescribe fraud in the purchase or sale of a security.").
79 United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that such a theory
renders "meaningless the 'in connection with...' statutory language"), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
2199 (1997). Rule lOb-5's unquestionably two part textual underpinning is actually quite
clear. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation Theory and
the New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fairness to Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB. L.
REv. 775, 784 (1988) (outlining Rule 10b(5) as a clear bipolar regulatory approach
consisting of two clauses that aim at unlawful conduct and unlawful effects respectively).
The problem with the misappropriation theory is that it imposes liability "based on the
breach of duty owed to the source of the information, not to the other party to the securities
transaction, thus ignoring the "in connection with" requirement. Timothy J. Horman,
Comment, In Defense of the United States v. Bryan: Why the Misappropriation Theory is
Indefensible, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2455, 2498 (1996) (endorsing the Fourth Circuit's
reading of the "in connection with" requirement as reaching 'only deception of persons with
some connection to, or some interest or stake in, an actual or proposed purchase or sale of
securities.' ") (quoting United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 950 (4th Cir. 1995)).
80 See Humke, supra note 77, at 819-30 (noting that" '[flor almost two decades, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against reading the 1934 Exchange Act 'more broadly
than its language and.., statutory scheme reasonably permit'.") (citing Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980)) (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
578 (1979)); accord Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (where the
Court refused to "add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from its
commonly accepted meaning"); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,473 (1977) (where
despite valid policy concerns, the Court relied on the language of the statute which gave "no
indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or
deception.").
"1 The Exchange Act defines directors and officers of a corporation who clearly owe
fiduciary duties as insiders, but the Chiarella Court was forced to bring employees within
the definition using its own language as those having 'a similar relation of trust and
confidence'. See Beeson, supra note 77, at 1145 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228).
Instead of leaving the onous on the courts, the SEC, with little trouble could include a
definition of an insider, which would include attorneys, bankers, accountants, and other
consultants who are typically trusted with confidential information by virtue of their
position. Id. at 1146. This would have the effect of making it easier to identify which
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However, undeterred by the language of §10(b), the Court extended the
disclosure obligation to the source of the information obtained by the
misappropriator, but did not go so far as to hold that any misappropriator of
nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose such information.82 To
justify this "limited" extension of the Rule, the majority relied on the close nexus
between O'Hagan's embezzlement of information and its use in connection with a
securities transaction as compared with the embezzlement of money.83 While the
actions performed by which persons constitute fraud in connection with a securities
transaction where, as in O'Hagan, the "traditional corporate fiduciary relationship is
absent." Id. at 1143; see also Jeffrey J. Hatch, Note, Logical Inconsistencies in the SEC's
Enforcement of Insider Trading: Guidelines for a Definition, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 935,
953 (1987) ("The SEC could amend rule lOb-5 to include an exact definition of insider
trading.... [A]n insider trading definition would not present an undue burden on the SEC's
enforcement of insider trading. [Ideally] Congress could alleviate the need for increased
litigation by offering examples of the types of activities that the definition covers and by
providing examples of exempted transactions.").
20 'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208 n.6 (1997) (noting that the Government was not asking
the Court to adopt Chief Justice Burger's broad reading of § 10(b)); see also Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (Burger, J., dissenting) ("By their terms, these provisions
reach any person engaged in any fraudulent scheme."). Justice Burger's reading of both the
statute and the rule goes too far. See Aldave, supra note 13, at 115. "There is virtually no
authority for the view that a defendant who has unlawfully obtained information, or
improperly converted information to his own use, is subject to an absolute duty to disclose
it to those with whom he transacts business." Id.
83 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 (discussing the Governments argument that the
acquisition of money through deceptive means would not invoke the misappropriation
theory, but that the acquisition of nonpublic information would). The Government's
comparison is as follows:
THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY IS LIMITED TO FRAUDULENT MEANS OF PROFITING ON
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THROUGH THE SALE OR PURCHASE OF SECURITIES, NOT ANY
FORM OF FRAUD INVOLVING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION -
Embezzlement of Money Embezzlement of Nonpublic Information
(1) The fraudulent act is consummated (1) The fraudulent act is consummated at
at the point the actor embezzles the money; the point the actor uses the information to
trade in securities.
(2) Money can be used to purchase things (2) Confidential information has no value
other than securities; apart from its use in connection with
securities transactions
(3) Therefore the theory does not apply. (3) Therefore, the misappropriation applies.
[Vol. 31:3,4
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former derives its value only from its use associated with securities, the latter can
be used in many other ways.84
This comparison is questionable because its validity is based on the premise that
the only value derived from nonpublic information is in connection with securities
transactions." As Justice Thomas points out in his dissent, if the "in connection
with" test is "whether the fraudulent act is necessarily tied to a securities
transaction, then the misappropriation of confidential information used to trade no
more violates § 10(b) than does the misappropriation of funds used to trade. 8 6 The
84 Id. The majority was content that the misappropriation theory satisfied the 'in
connection with requirement' "because the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the
fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal,
he uses the information to purchase or sell securities." Id. In contrast, the embezzlement
of money would not fall within the theory because "money can buy, if not anything, then at
least many things; its misappropriation may thus be viewed as sufficiently detached from a
subsequent securities transaction that § I0(b)'s 'in connection with' requirement would not
be met." Id.
" Id. at 2210 ("Observing that money can be used for all manner of purposes and
purchases, the Government urges that confidential information of the kind at issue derives
its value only from its utility in securities trading."). This was a contentious point between
the dissent and the majority, resulting in bantering, back and forth, over what uses
confidential information may be applied toward. The dissent: "O'Hagan could have done
any number of things with the information: He could have sold it to a newspaper for
publication; he could have given or sold the information to Pillsbury itself; or he could even
have kept the information and used it solely for his personal amusement, perhaps in a fantasy
stock trading game." Id. at 2223 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority: "It is hardly
remarkable that a rule suitably applied to the fraudulent uses off certain kinds of information
would be stretched beyond reason were it applied to the fraudulent use of money... [T]he
dissent's evident struggle to invent other uses to which O'Hagan plausibly might have put
the nonpublic information is telling." Id. at 2210 n.8.
8 Id. at 2224 (Thomas, J., dissenting). It should not matter whether or not the
misappropriator actually uses the information to purchase securities because in both the case
of embezzling money and the case of embezzling information, the fraudulent actor could use
the material for purposes other than the purchase of securities. Id. at 2223. See Mitchell,
supra note 79, at 830 (noting that "it is not at all clear what misappropriation of information
has to do with fraud, especially if the person from whom the information was misappropri-
ated was not trading in the securities to which it relates"). The Government's argument
clearly contradicts the holding in Dirks, where the Court found that the tippee would have
been liable if the tipper had breached a fiduciary duty. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646,
664-65 (1983). But, under the misappropriation theory, the tipper could pass the information
to a tippee in breach of a fiduciary duty. The misappropriation occurred when the tipper
passed the information, but before the tippee used the information to trade in securities.
Thus, the tipper would not be liable under the misappropriation theory.
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effect of the Court's rational is to impose an absolute duty on those who have
misappropriated nonpublic information, regardless of whether it is in connection
with a securities transaction. 7 Thus, the Court's adoption of the misappropriation
theory is a carefully cloaked engraftment to § 10(b)."8
B. The Court's Substitution of Ordinarily for the Government's Theory of Only
The O'Hagan Court partially recognized the flaw in the Government's
embezzlement comparison. 89 To rescue the analytical deficiency of the Govern-
ment's argument that misappropriated nonpublic information derives its only value
in connection with a securities transaction, the majority replaced the term only with
ordinarily.9" Aside from the dubious act of the Court substituting its own theory
for the one presented by the SEC,91 the term will leave future traders wondering
" The majority's holding also contravenes Chiarella by requiring that O'Hagan disclose
the information upon his "mere possession of nonpublic market information." Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225 (1980). The duty to disclose does not arise unless
O'Hagan had a relationship with the parties to a transaction. See Shawn J. Lindquist, Note,
United States v. 0 'Hagan: The Eighth Circuit Throws the Second Strike to the Misappropri-
ation Theory of Rule 1OB-5 Liability, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REv. 197, 221 (1997) (The Supreme
Court in Chiarella rejected the notion that "a complete stranger to the market participants
and deals with them only through impersonal market transactions, [can be] liable under
section 10(b).. ."). This means that the defendant in Chiarella, who was not found liable
under § 10(b), would be found liable under the misappropriation theory even though he
owed no duty to the parties connected with a securities transaction, simply because he
possessed information. See Beeson, supra note 77, at 1147.
88 See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,472 (1997) (rejecting the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals' attempt to "add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite
different from its commonly accepted meaning") (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 199 (1976)) (internal quotations omitted); but see United States v. O'Hagan, 117
S. Ct. 2199, 2220 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing
Rule lOb-5 as "no less ambiguous than the statute" (§10(b)).
89 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210 ("The dissent does catch the Government in overstate-
ment.").
0 Id. ("Substitute 'ordinary' for 'only' and the Government is on the mark."). Justice
Thomas notes that by substituting ordinarily for only, the majority vitiates its entire
justification for relying upon the Government's proffered theory which satisfies the 'in
connection with' requirement because of the close nexus between the breach of duty and the
use of the information to purchase securities. Id. at 2224 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("one is
left to wonder how we could possibly rely on a post hoc rationalization invented by this
Court and never presented by the Commission for our consideration").
91 Id. ("It is a fundamental proposition of law that this Court 'may not supply a reasoned
basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given.' ") (quoting Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n. of United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
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92what type of information is ordinarily associated with securities transactions.
The majority attempts to save itself by saturating its opinion with fragments of
legislative intent evidencing a concern for preserving honest and informed securities
markets. 93 It is obvious that one who misappropriates nonpublic information
obtains an advantage in the market, creating a disadvantage to other traders which
"cannot be overcome with research or skill."94 However, the Court's requirement
that the misappropriation theory target information that ordinarily derives its value
through securities transactions is a tenuous hitch to § 10(b)'s textual requirement
that the deceptive use of information be "in connection with the sale or purchase of
a security."95 Rather than imposing a judicially molded, all encompassing rule,
regulating all types of fraud in the "corporate universe",9 6 the Court should allow
state corporate law to serve as the means for punishing deceptive acts unconnected
with securities transactions. 97 Moreover, a clear definition of insider trading will
92 Id. at 2225 ("persons subject to this new theory, such as respondent here, surely could
not comply with the new theory, because until today, the theory has never existed"); see also
Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 71, at B4 ("The lasting impact of O'Hagan will be in the
difficult gray areas in which, to date, the SEC's Enforcement Division has tempered its
desire to press enforcement actions."). "Ordinarily" the SEC does not involve itself in
situations where a "company's spokesperson disseminates key information on a selective
basis" to market analysts or the financial press, where clearly this "segment of the market
place is afforded an opportunity to trade directly on the basis of material, nonpublic
information." Id. The theory the majority adopted in O'Hagan does not make clear whether
this type of selective disclosure creates a duty upon the recipients to refrain from trading.
9' O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210 ("The theory is also well-tuned to an animating purpose
of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor
confidence.").
9 Id. ("An investor's informational disadvantage vis-a-vis a misappropriator with
material, nonpublic information stems from contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that
cannot be overcome with research or skill.").
9' See Humke, supra note 77, at 811 (stating simply that "the misappropriation theory
does not meet the in connection with requirement").
96 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 480 (1977) ("There may well be a need for
uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers such as that challenged in this
complaint. But those standards should not be supplied by judicial extension of § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 to 'cover the corporate universe.' ") (quoting William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974)).
' Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties Into the Federal
Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1189, 1258 (1995) (noting that the
"first place one must look to determine the powers of corporate directors is in the relevant
State's corporation law."). Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently expressed concerns
that expanding the depth of fiduciary duties owed to corporations would encroach upon state
corporate laws. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 478-79 (refusing to extend Rule lOb-5 private
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help remedy the gap left open by § 10(b), but it is Congress and not the Court that
should be the one to fill it.98
C. Redefining The Meaning of Fraud
The Supreme Court's finding that Rule 14e-3(a)'s omission of a breach of
fiduciary duty requirement may be a reasonable means of preventing fraudulent
conduct but it is also the equivalent of permitting the SEC to define a new species
of fraud. 99 Section 14(e) allows the SEC to "define and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent."' ° In the context of
securities regulations, however, a deceptive act is the failure to disclose when there
is "a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence."'0 ' The
actions against fiduciary's who have not acted deceptively, the Court noted that to do so
"would be to bring within the Rule a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to
state regulation"). The misappropriation theory imposes a duty to persons that Congress
never envisioned would fall under federal law. Bainbridge, supra at 1258 ("the legislative
history of the Exchange Act demonstrates that Congress intended to leave regulation of
corporate governance to the states") (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910
(1961)).
98 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) ("When a statute speaks
so specifically... and when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite
unwilling to extend the scope of the statute.. . ."). No doubt Mr. O'Hagan should be
punished for his actions, but "the desire to produce liability in circumstances of these cases
has led to an inadequate and unworkable doctrine." Beeson, supra note 77, at 1142. The
problem facing the Court in O'Hagan was the same problem that caused the split among the
Federal Circuits: Mr. O'Hagan's actions gave him an impermissible advantage obtained by
a deceptive act, which did not fall within the plain text of Rule lOb-5. To remedy this
anomalous situation, the text should be amended, not the way courts interpret it. See Central
Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 175 (1994) ("Our consideration of statutory
duties, especially in cases interpreting § 10(b), establishes that the statutory text controls the
definition of conduct covered by § 10(b).").
9 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2227 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the Eighth
Circuit's finding that Rule lOb-5 "exceeds the scope of the Commission's authority to define
such acts and practices as 'are fraudulent' "). Tortious fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit
involves the following factors: (1) a false representation, (2) knowledge that the
representation is false ('scienter'), (3) intent to induce action or inaction on the part of the
plaintiff, (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (5) damage. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 105, 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
" 15 U.S.C. §78n(e) (1997). See supra note 12 (providing statutory text of §14(e) and
Rule 14e-3(a)).
101 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (holding that §10(b) liability
must be "premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence
between parties to a transaction"). Thus, without the existence of a fiduciary relationship
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Court neglects this point by emphasizing that the SEC was granted rulemaking
authority to carry-out a prophylactic measure, i.e to prevent fraudulent conduct
through "reasonably designed" methods.'0 2
However, Rule 14e-3(a) exceeds this statutory mandate by not requiring a
breach of fiduciary duty. 10 3 As both statutes are part of the same legislative scheme,
the Supreme Court has relied on § 10(b) to interpret § 14(e).104 Since the duty to
disclose under § 10(b) arises out of a fiduciary obligation, § 14(e) also requires a
breach of a fiduciary obligation.'0 5 Yet, Rule 14e-3(a) is barren, requiring simply
that all parties must "disclose or abstain from trading" on material, nonpublic
information in the tender offer context.'1 6 While, Rule 14e-3(a) helps to achieve the
and a subsequent failure to disclose there can be no deception. Id.
" O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2217 ("[A] prophylactic measure, because its mission is to
prevent, typically encompasses more than the core activity prohibited.").
103 Id. at 2228 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Rule 14e-3(a) does not prohibit merely trading
in connection with fraudulent nondisclosure, but rather it prohibits trading in connection
with any nondisclosure, regardless of the presence of a pre-existing duty.").
'0' Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (after rejecting the
petitioner's argument that § 10(b)'s requirement of a manipulative or fraudulent act should
not be applied to §14(e), the Court noted that "it is a 'familiar principle of statutory
construction that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.' ") (quoting
Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207, 218 (1984)).
105 United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 625 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1997) ("Reading Schreiber and Chiarella together [while] interpreting § 14(e) and § 10(b)
respectively leads to the conclusion that 'fraudulent' under § 14(e) includes the breach of a
fiduciary obligation."). The Supreme Court found this interpretation irrelevant since Rule
14e-3(a) is not an attempt by the SEC to define fraud as requiring something less than a
breach of a fiduciary or similar duty, but merely a means by which the SEC "may prohibit
acts, not themselves fraudulent... [but which are] reasonably designed to prevent" acts that
are fraudulent. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2217. However, the Eighth Circuit is correct when
it states that the SEC may not define the meaning of fraud under § 14(e). Voves, supra note
37, at 1035 ("Interpreting s 14(e) to allow the SEC to either define s 14(e) fraud itself or
prohibit insider trading in the absence of fraud infringes on the independent statutory
meaning of § 14(e)'s anti-fraud provisions, and thus conflicts directly with the Supreme
Court's holding in Schreiber."). The fact is, Rule 14e-3(a) indirectly allows the SEC to
define fraud because it has the effect of "placing a duty on all market participants to disclose
inside tender offer information before trading on the basis of such information." Id.
106 The majority justified the disclose or refrain from trading requirement of Rule 14e-
3(a) as a reasonable means of preventing fraud by noting that the SEC is entitled to
deference in its interpretation of §14(e). O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2217-18 ("[W]e must
accord the Commission's assessment 'controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, or
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.' ") (quoting Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). How redefining the meaning of fraud in
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Congressional purpose of ensuring "informed decision making by shareholders,"107
it has the effect of redefining fraud according to the discretion of the SEC.1 °8
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's intentions in O'Hagan were laudable. In enacting § 10(b), Congress
intended to limit fraudulent and deceptive acts in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities by filling the statutory gaps left by § 10(b) using the misappropria-
tion theory. 09 Yet, the Supreme Court has likely not seen the last of the misappro-
priation theory and §10(b). Likewise, litigation over what other elements of
securities fraud the SEC can redefine to satisfy the "reasonably designed to prevent
fraud" language of Rule 14e-3(a) is imminent. Henceforth, the SEC and other
administrative agencies should feel uninhibited by the language of their statutory
mandates in promulgating regulations to carry out their own agendas.
Joseph J. Urgese
the securities context is not contrary to the statute is unclear. The Rule, by its own terms,
defines fraud as the mere possession "of material information [the actor] knows or has
reason to know is nonpublic" without disclosure to the information's source. 17 CFR § 14e-
3(a) (1996); see also O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2228 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("the Rule, on
its face, does not purport to be an exercise of the Commission's prophylactic power, but
rather a redefinition of what 'constitute[s] a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or
practice within the meaning of § 14(e)' ").
107 Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) ("very purpose"
[of Williams Act] was "informed decision making by shareholders"). The effect of rule 14e-
3(a) would require a party owing no duty to the shareholders of a company to sit idle or
disclose the information to the public, causing even more harm to the shareholders.
'0' O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2228 n.10 (Thomas J., dissenting) (noting that allowing the
SEC to give its own construction to a statute brings into question whether the court
performing an executive function or a lawmaking function) (citing J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
'09 However, as Justice Powell noted, "there are always winners and losers; but those
who have lost have not necessarily been defrauded" under § 10(b). Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 667 n.27 (1983).
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